Understanding and managing risk in security systems for the DOE nuclear weapons complex (abbreviated version) :
Understanding and managing risk in security systems for the DOE nuclear weapons complex (abbreviated version) : electronic resource Committee on Risk-Based Approaches for Securing the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex ; Nuclear and Radiation Studies Board ; Division on Earth and Life Studies ; National Research Council of the National Academies , Text - Washington : National Academies Press, c2011. - 1 PDF-file (30 p.)
E-book. A nuclear weapon or a significant quantity of special nuclear material (SNM) would be of great value to a terrorist or other adversary. It is in this context that the U.S. Congress directed the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) -- a semi-autonomous agency in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) responsible for securing nuclear weapons and significant quantities of spent nuclear material (SNM) -- asked the National Academies for advice on augmenting its security approach, particularly on the applicability of quantitative and other risk-based approaches for securing its facilities. In carrying out its charge, the committee has focused on what actions NNSA could take to make its security approach more effective and efficient. The committee concluded that the solution to balancing cost, security, and operations at facilities in the nuclear weapons complex is not to assess security risks more quantitatively or more precisely.
0309208858 9780309208840
nuclear weapons--facilities--USA
E-book. A nuclear weapon or a significant quantity of special nuclear material (SNM) would be of great value to a terrorist or other adversary. It is in this context that the U.S. Congress directed the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) -- a semi-autonomous agency in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) responsible for securing nuclear weapons and significant quantities of spent nuclear material (SNM) -- asked the National Academies for advice on augmenting its security approach, particularly on the applicability of quantitative and other risk-based approaches for securing its facilities. In carrying out its charge, the committee has focused on what actions NNSA could take to make its security approach more effective and efficient. The committee concluded that the solution to balancing cost, security, and operations at facilities in the nuclear weapons complex is not to assess security risks more quantitatively or more precisely.
0309208858 9780309208840
nuclear weapons--facilities--USA