Puncturing the counterinsurgency myth : (Record no. 76710)

MARC details
000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 02644cam a22003377a 4500
001 - CONTROL NUMBER
control field 12418727
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER
control field SE-LIBR
005 - DATE AND TIME
control field 20120809144735.0
008 - GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 111122s2011 pau | f000 0 eng c
020 ## - ISBN
ISBN 1584875097
020 ## - ISBN
ISBN 9781584875093
040 ## - CATALOGUING LIBRARY
Original cataloging library AWC
Modifying library IXA
-- Sipr
041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE
Language code eng
100 1# - AUTHOR
Personal name Mumford, Andrew
245 10 - TITLE
Title Puncturing the counterinsurgency myth :
Subtitle Britain and irregular warfare in the past, present, and future /
Author, etc Andrew Mumford
260 ## - PUBLICATION DATA
Place of publication Carlisle, PA :
Publisher Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College,
Year 2011
300 ## - PAGES ETC
Pages vii, 26 p. ;
Dimensions 23 cm.
490 1# - SERIES TITLE
Series title Advancing strategic thought series
500 ## - GENERAL NOTE
General note "September 2011."
504 ## - BIBLIOGRAPHY, ETC. NOTE
About the authors Includes bibliographical references (p. 23-26).
505 0# - CONTENTS
Contents Introduction -- Myth #1 : the British military is an effective learning institution -- Myth #2 : British civil-military COIN planning is strategically perceptive -- Myth #3 : the British military has flexibly adapted to the demands of COIN -- Myth #4 : the British military has an ingrained educational approach to COIN -- Myth #5 : Iraq represented the zenith of 60 years worth of modern COIN learning -- Myth #6 : the British can do COIN alone -- Myth #7 : the British "don't talk to terrorists" -- Myth #8 : "hearts and minds" and "minimum force" are sacrosanct elements of the British way of COIN -- Myth #9 : the Malayan emergency is the archetypal COIN campaign -- Myth #10 : the British military are the ultimate COIN practitioners -- The value of the British experience.
520 ## - SUMMARY
Summary, etc This monograph holds that an aura of mythology has surrounded conventional academic and military perceptions of British performance in the realm of irregular warfare. It identifies 10 myths regarding British counterinsurgency performance and seeks to puncture them by critically assessing the efficacy of the British way of counterinsurgency from the much-vaunted, yet over-hyped, Malayan Emergency to the withdrawal of combat troops from Iraq in 2009. It challenges perceptions of the British military as an effective learning institution when it comes to irregular warfare and critically assesses traditional British counterinsurgency strategic maxims regarding hearts and minds and minimum force.
650 #7 - KEYWORD
Keyword counterinsurgency
Geographic subdivision UK
651 #7 - KEYWORD/GEOGRAPHIC
Geographic keyword UK
Subdivision military strategy
-- military doctrines
-- history
653 ## - UNCONTROLLED KEYWORD
Uncontrolled keyword irregular warfare
710 2# - ADDED INSTITUTION
Institution US Army War College.
Subordinate unit Strategic Studies Institute, SSI
830 #0 - AUTHORIZED SERIES TITLE
Authorized title Advancing strategic thought series.
852 ## - LOCATION
Classification part 323.27 Mumford
856 41 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION
URI http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1086.pdf
942 ## - ITEM TYPE (KOHA)
Koha item type report
Holdings
Withdrawn status Lost status Damaged status Not for loan Home library Current library Date acquired Total Checkouts Full call number Acquisition no. Date last seen Koha item type
        SIPRI Library and Documentation SIPRI Library and Documentation 2011-11-25   323.27 Mumford G11/1163 2011-11-25 report