MARC details
| 000 -LEADER |
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04154cam a22004337a 4500 |
| 001 - CONTROL NUMBER |
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13520265 |
| 003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER |
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| control field |
SE-LIBR |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME |
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| control field |
20121027225812.0 |
| 008 - GENERAL INFORMATION |
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| fixed length control field |
120906s2012 sw |||| | |00| 0 eng c |
| 020 ## - ISBN |
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| ISBN |
9789185114726 |
| 022 ## - ISSN |
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| ISSN |
1652-0432 |
| 040 ## - CATALOGUING LIBRARY |
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| Original cataloging library |
Sipr |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE |
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| Language code |
eng |
| 100 1# - AUTHOR |
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| Personal name |
Kile, Shannon N. |
| 245 10 - TITLE |
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| Title |
Verifying a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty : |
| Subtitle |
technical and organizational considerations / |
| Author, etc |
Shannon N. Kile and Robert E. Kelley |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION DATA |
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| Place of publication |
Solna : |
| Publisher |
SIPRI, |
| Year |
2012 |
| 300 ## - PAGES ETC |
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| Pages |
42 p. |
| 490 0# - SERIES TITLE |
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| Series title |
SIPRI policy paper ; |
| Number |
33 |
| 500 ## - GENERAL NOTE |
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| General note |
A future FMCT should provide for the establishment of a dedicated verification body—a standing verification group (SVG)—that would be formally part of the IAEA and would draw on the agency’s experience and formidable technical skills in implementing safeguards. The SVG would function autonomously from the IAEA Department of Safeguards in terms of interacting with states parties, planning inspections and drawing conclusions about the compliance of parties with their treaty commitments. The conclusions would be shared with an independent FMCT organization (FMCTO) that would be responsible for overseeing the implementation of the treaty and addressing compliance questions. |
| 500 ## - GENERAL NOTE |
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| General note |
SIP1209 |
| 500 ## - GENERAL NOTE |
|---|
| General note |
Cover : "August 2012". |
| 504 ## - BIBLIOGRAPHY, ETC. NOTE |
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| About the authors |
Shannon N. Kile (United States) is a Senior Researcher and Head of the Nuclear Weapons Project of the SIPRI Arms Control and Non-proliferation Programme. His principal areas of research are nuclear arms control and non-proliferation, with a special interest in the nuclear programmes of Iran<br/>and North Korea. |
| 504 ## - BIBLIOGRAPHY, ETC. NOTE |
|---|
| About the authors |
Robert E. Kelley (United States) is a former IAEA senior safeguards<br/>inspector and director of the Iraq Action Team. He is a veteran of over<br/>35 years in the US Department of Energy nuclear weapons complex, most<br/>recently at Los Alamos National Laboratory. |
| 505 ## - CONTENTS |
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| Contents |
1. Introduction<br/>2. FMCT verification choices<br/>3. FMCT verification tasks and tools<br/>4. The design of an FMCT inspection system<br/>5. The role of the IAEA in verifying an FMCT<br/>6. A proposal for the structure and operation of an FMCT verification body<br/>7. Conclusions<br/>Appendix A. Categories of IAEA safeguards agreement |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY |
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| Summary, etc |
The renewed momentum behind international efforts to negotiate a fissile<br/>material cut-off treaty (FMCT) has focused attention on how the proposed<br/>ban on the production of fissile material will be verified: what type of<br/>organization should be given this responsibility and what technical<br/>expertise will it require?<br/>The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is often identified as the<br/>obvious choice for this role, given its long experience in implementing<br/>nuclear safeguards agreements. Many of the tools and procedures<br/>developed by the IAEA for safeguards purposes could be directly applied to<br/>verifying a future FMCT. However, without changes to its existing<br/>safeguards mandate and practices, the IAEA would be hindered in verifying<br/>treaty compliance in the nuclear weapon-possessing states. This Policy<br/>Paper proposes an alternative arrangement that, while taking advantage of<br/>the IAEA's experience and expertise, creates a verification body tailored<br/>specifically for an FMCT with the requisite legal mandate and technical<br/>capabilities. |
| 650 #7 - KEYWORD |
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| Keyword |
FMCT |
| Subdivision |
verification |
| -- |
sampling |
| 650 #7 - KEYWORD |
|---|
| Keyword |
safeguards |
| Subdivision |
IAEA |
| -- |
inspection |
| 700 1# - ADDED AUTHOR/EDITOR |
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| Author/Editor |
Kelley, Robert E. |
| 710 2# - ADDED INSTITUTION |
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| Institution |
SIPRI |
| 852 ## - LOCATION |
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| Classification part |
341.67SIPRI SIPRI policy paper |
| 856 40 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION |
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| URI |
http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=448 |
| 900 ## - |
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| -- |
Shannon N. Kile and Robert E. Kelley |
| 901 ## - |
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PP |
| 902 ## - |
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| -- |
Arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament |
| 942 ## - ITEM TYPE (KOHA) |
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| Koha item type |
report |
| 957 ## - |
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| -- |
http://rcm.amazon.com/e/cm?t=s00787-20&o=1&p=8&l=as1&asins=9185114723&IS1=1&ref=tf_til&fc1=000000<1=_blank&m=amazon&lc1=0000FF&bc1=000000&bg1=E8EFF5&f=ifr |
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XY3PHUXNSZXR4 |
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