The role of space systems in nuclear deterrence / (Record no. 80355)
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fixed length control field | 02124cam a22003017a 4500 |
001 - CONTROL NUMBER | |
control field | 8jn3pfkm6xb7cbhr |
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER | |
control field | SE-LIBR |
005 - DATE AND TIME | |
control field | 20231002131117.0 |
007 - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION FIXED FIELD--GENERAL INFORMATION | |
fixed length control field | cr ||| ||||| |
008 - GENERAL INFORMATION | |
fixed length control field | 181109s2018 sw |||||o|||||000 ||eng|c |
040 ## - CATALOGUING LIBRARY | |
Original cataloging library | Sipr |
041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
Language code | eng |
100 1# - AUTHOR | |
Personal name | Raju, Nivedita |
245 10 - TITLE | |
Title | The role of space systems in nuclear deterrence / |
Medium | [electronic resource] |
Author, etc | Nivedita Raju and Tytti Erästö |
256 ## - COMPUTER FILE CHARACTERISTICS | |
Computer file characteristics | Text |
260 ## - PUBLICATION DATA | |
Place of publication | Solna : |
Publisher | SIPRI, |
Year | 2023 |
300 ## - PAGES ETC | |
Pages | 23 p. |
490 0# - SERIES TITLE | |
Series title | SIPRI background paper |
500 ## - GENERAL NOTE | |
General note | SIP2223 |
500 ## - GENERAL NOTE | |
General note | "September 2023" |
500 ## - GENERAL NOTE | |
General note | Space systems are used for multiple civilian and military purposes, including missions related to nuclear deterrence. Consequently, real and perceived military operations targeting space systems may create pathways to nuclear escalation. <br/>China, Russia and the United States possess both nuclear weapons and counterspace capabilities, and they are at risk of being drawn into war with each other through regional conflicts and great power competition. These states have integrated space systems into their nuclear deterrence practices to varying degrees for missile early warning, communications, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), and navigation. These space systems can be vulnerable to attack or interference through counterspace capabilities—including direct-ascent and co-orbital anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, directed-energy weapons, electronic interference and cyber operations. <br/>Each of the three states’ space systems has varying strategic value. Each system is also vulnerable to the counterspace capabilities of the others. Examining space systems relevant to nuclear deterrence and assessing their vulnerabilities lays the groundwork for further analysis on escalation pathways and risk-reduction measures. |
650 ## - KEYWORD | |
Keyword | deterrence |
Subdivision | nuclear strategy |
-- | nuclear weapons |
-- | space research |
-- | space |
Geographic subdivision | USA |
-- | Russia |
-- | China |
700 ## - ADDED AUTHOR/EDITOR | |
Author/Editor | Erästö, Tytti |
710 2# - ADDED INSTITUTION | |
Institution | SIPRI |
852 ## - LOCATION | |
Classification part | Fri e-publikation |
856 ## - ELECTRONIC LOCATION | |
URI | https://doi.org/10.55163/NWLC4997 |
942 ## - ITEM TYPE (KOHA) | |
Koha item type | electronic publication |
Withdrawn status | Lost status | Damaged status | Not for loan | Home library | Current library | Date acquired | Total Checkouts | Full call number | Acquisition no. | Date last seen | Koha item type |
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SIPRI Library and Documentation | SIPRI Library and Documentation | 2023-10-18 | CD2023 G23_156 | G23/156 | 2023-10-18 | electronic publication | |||||
SIPRI Library and Documentation | SIPRI Library and Documentation | 2023-10-18 | 341.67SIPRI SIPRI background paper | G23/157 | 2023-10-18 | report | |||||
SIPRI Library and Documentation | SIPRI Library and Documentation | 2023-10-18 | 341.67SIPRI SIPRI background paper | G23/158 | 2023-10-18 | report |