The role of space systems in nuclear deterrence / (Record no. 80355)

MARC details
000 -LEADER
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001 - CONTROL NUMBER
control field 8jn3pfkm6xb7cbhr
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER
control field SE-LIBR
005 - DATE AND TIME
control field 20231002131117.0
007 - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION FIXED FIELD--GENERAL INFORMATION
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008 - GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 181109s2018 sw |||||o|||||000 ||eng|c
040 ## - CATALOGUING LIBRARY
Original cataloging library Sipr
041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE
Language code eng
100 1# - AUTHOR
Personal name Raju, Nivedita
245 10 - TITLE
Title The role of space systems in nuclear deterrence /
Medium [electronic resource]
Author, etc Nivedita Raju and Tytti Erästö
256 ## - COMPUTER FILE CHARACTERISTICS
Computer file characteristics Text
260 ## - PUBLICATION DATA
Place of publication Solna :
Publisher SIPRI,
Year 2023
300 ## - PAGES ETC
Pages 23 p.
490 0# - SERIES TITLE
Series title SIPRI background paper
500 ## - GENERAL NOTE
General note SIP2223
500 ## - GENERAL NOTE
General note "September 2023"
500 ## - GENERAL NOTE
General note Space systems are used for multiple civilian and military purposes, including missions related to nuclear deterrence. Consequently, real and perceived military operations targeting space systems may create pathways to nuclear escalation. <br/>China, Russia and the United States possess both nuclear weapons and counterspace capabilities, and they are at risk of being drawn into war with each other through regional conflicts and great power competition. These states have integrated space systems into their nuclear deterrence practices to varying degrees for missile early warning, communications, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), and navigation. These space systems can be vulnerable to attack or interference through counterspace capabilities—including direct-ascent and co-orbital anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, directed-energy weapons, electronic interference and cyber operations. <br/>Each of the three states’ space systems has varying strategic value. Each system is also vulnerable to the counterspace capabilities of the others. Examining space systems relevant to nuclear deterrence and assessing their vulnerabilities lays the groundwork for further analysis on escalation pathways and risk-reduction measures.
650 ## - KEYWORD
Keyword deterrence
Subdivision nuclear strategy
-- nuclear weapons
-- space research
-- space
Geographic subdivision USA
-- Russia
-- China
700 ## - ADDED AUTHOR/EDITOR
Author/Editor Erästö, Tytti
710 2# - ADDED INSTITUTION
Institution SIPRI
852 ## - LOCATION
Classification part Fri e-publikation
856 ## - ELECTRONIC LOCATION
URI https://doi.org/10.55163/NWLC4997
942 ## - ITEM TYPE (KOHA)
Koha item type electronic publication
Holdings
Withdrawn status Lost status Damaged status Not for loan Home library Current library Date acquired Total Checkouts Full call number Acquisition no. Date last seen Koha item type
        SIPRI Library and Documentation SIPRI Library and Documentation 2023-10-18   CD2023 G23_156 G23/156 2023-10-18 electronic publication
        SIPRI Library and Documentation SIPRI Library and Documentation 2023-10-18   341.67SIPRI SIPRI background paper G23/157 2023-10-18 report
        SIPRI Library and Documentation SIPRI Library and Documentation 2023-10-18   341.67SIPRI SIPRI background paper G23/158 2023-10-18 report