000			02990cam a22003134a 4500
003			LIBRIS
005			20120809144631.0
008			071017s2007 xxk 000 0 eng c
020			_a9780415418690 (pbk.)
020			_a0-415-41869-0 (pbk.)
022			_a0567-932X
040			_aBTCTA _dDLC _dJ2H _dSNM _dAFQ _dBAKER _dUKM _dYDXCP _dAlb; sipr
041			_aeng
090			_c74027 _d74026
245	0	0	_aRepairing the damage _bpossibilities and limits of transatlantic consensus _cDana H. Allin ... [et al.].
260			_aAbingdon, Oxon _bRoutledge _c2007
300			_a103 p.
490		0	_aAdelphi paper _vno. 389
500			_a"Published for the International Institute for Strategic Studies"--T.p. verso.
520			_aThe damage that has been done to the transatlantic alliance will not be repaired through grand architectural redesigns or radical new agendas. Instead, the transatlantic partners need to restore their consensus and cooperation on key security challenges with a limited agenda that reflects the essential conservatism of the transatlantic partnership during the Cold War and the 1990s. There will inevitably be big challenges, such as the rise of China, where transatlantic disparities in strategic means and commitments preclude any common alliance undertaking. Yet such limits are nothing new. The absence of a common transatlantic commitment to counter-insurgency in Iraq may cause resentments, but so too did the lack of a common commitment to counter-insurgency in Vietnam. This paper suggests ten propositions for future transatlantic consensus -- that is to say, ten security challenges for which the allies should be able to agree on common approaches. These run the gamut from an effective strategy to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear-weapons capability to transatlantic leadership for international cooperation against global warming. If pursued with seriousness and a reasonable degree of transatlantic unity, these propositions could constitute the foundations of an effective partnership. They are, in the authors' view, the basis for a consensus on the most pressing security challenges of the twenty-first century. The time is right for this kind of serious re-dedication to alliance purposes. There has already been some effort to repair the damage; moreover, new leaders are in place in or coming to the countries that were major protagonists of the transatlantic crisis: Germany, France, Britain and, in 2009, the United States. It is possible that these four new leaders will be better able to put the disputes of the recent past behind them. This extended essay is a guide to the possibilities, and also the limits, of a new start.
650		7	_ainternational relations _zUSA _zEurope
650		7	_anuclear weapons _xnonproliferation
650		7	_apeacebuilding
700	1		_aAllin, Dana H., _d1958-
710			_aInternational Institute for Strategic Studies, IISS
942			_cREP
946			_asip0910
999			_c73788 _d73788