000			02128cam a22002897a 4500
003			LIBRIS
005			20120809144633.0
008			091021s2009 paua | f000 0 eng c
020			_a9781584874027
020			_a1-58487-402-3
040			_aAWC _dSipr
041			_aeng
090			_c74092 _d74091
100	1		_aKelly, Justin
245	1	0	_aAlien _bhow operational art devoured strategy _cby Justin Kelly and Mike Brennan
260			_aCarlisle, PA _bStrategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College _c2009
300			_aviii, 120 p. _bill.
500			_a"September 2009."
520			_aThe 1982 Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, introduced the idea of an operational level of war encompassing the planning and conduct of campaigns and major operations. The introduction of the term "operational art" three years later was, in practice, the skillful management of the operational level of war. Identifiably separate levels of war defined the jurisdiction of the profession of arms and was, for a number of historical and cultural reasons, attractive to U.S. practitioners and plausible to its English-speaking allies. The authors argue that as warfare continues to diffuse across definitional and conceptual boundaries, the close orchestration of all instruments of national power becomes even more important, which cripples the current conception of campaigns and operations. The authors propose that responsibility for campaign design should "actually" return to the political-strategic leadership of nations supported by the entirety of the state bureaucracy. This would mark the return of the campaign to its historical sources. If the United States and its allies fail to make this change, they risk continuing to have a "way of battle" rather than a "way of war."
650		0	_amilitary strategy _xmilitary doctrines _zUSA
700	1		_aBrennan, Mike
710	2		_aUS Army War College. _bStrategic Studies Institute, SSI
856	4	1	_zCLICK HERE TO VIEW: _uhttp://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=939
942			_cMONO
946			_aSIP0910
999			_c73853 _d73853