000			02972cam a22003137a 4500
003			LIBRIS
005			20120809144658.0
008			100602s2010 pauab f000 0 eng c
020			_a9781584874355
020			_a1-58487-435-X
040			_aAWC _dKUK _dDLC _dAFQ _dAlb _dsipr
041			_aeng
090			_c75292 _d75290
100	1		_aNuzum, Henry
245	1	0	_aShades of CORDS in the Kush _bthe false hope of "unity of effort" in American counterinsurgency _cHenry Nuzum
246	1		_aShades of Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support in the Kush
260			_aCarlisle, PA _bStrategic Studies Institute (SSI), U.S. Army War College _c[2010]
300			_axii, 132 p. _bill., maps
490	1		_aLetort papers _v[no. 37]
500			_a"April 2010."
520			_a"Counterinsurgency (COIN) requires an integrated military, political, and economic program best developed by teams that field both civilians and soldiers. These units should operate with some independence but under a coherent command. In Vietnam, after several false starts, the United States developed an effective unified organization, Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), to guide the counterinsurgency. CORDS had three components absent from our efforts in Afghanistan today: sufficient personnel (particularly civilian), numerous teams, and a single chain of command that united the separate COIN programs of the disparate American departments at the district, provincial, regional, and national levels. This paper focuses on the third issue and describes the benefits that unity of command at every level would bring to the American war in Afghanistan. The work begins with a brief introduction to counterinsurgency theory, using a population-centric model, and examines how this warfare challenges the United States. It traces the evolution of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and the country team, describing problems at both levels. Similar efforts in Vietnam are compared, where persistent executive attention finally integrated the government's counterinsurgency campaign under the unified command of the CORDS program. The next section attributes the American tendency towards a segregated response to cultural differences between the primary departments, executive neglect, and societal concepts of war. The paper argues that, in its approach to COIN, the United States has forsaken the military concept of unity of command in favor of 'unity of effort' expressed in multiagency literature. The final sections describe how unified authority would improve our efforts in Afghanistan and propose a model for the future."--P. iii.
650		0	_acounterinsurgency _zAfghanistan
651		0	_aUSA _xmilitary strategy
710	2		_aArmy War College (U.S.). _bStrategic Studies Institute.
856	4	1	_uhttp://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB981.pdf
942			_cREP
946			_asip1006
999			_c75041 _d75041