000			02227cam a2200301 a 4500
003			LIBRIS
005			20120809144720.0
008			101228s2010 pau f000 0 eng c
020			_a9781584874676
020			_a1-58487-467-8
040			_aAWC _dDLC _dAlb; sipr
041			_aeng
090			_c76167 _d76165
100	1		_aHodgson, Quentin E.
245	1	0	_aDeciding to buy _bcivil-military relations and major weapons programs _cQuentin E. Hodgson.
260			_aCarlisle, PA _bStrategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College _c[2010]
300			_aix, 117 p.
490	1		_aLetort papers _v[no. 45]
500			_a"November 2010."
520			_a"The development and procurement of major weapons programs in the United States is a complex and often drawn-out process complicated by political considerations and often sharp disagreements over requirements and the merits of systems. Secretaries of Defense since Robert McNamara have sought to impose discipline on the process, with varying degrees of success. Conflicts between a Military Service and the civilian leadership are inevitable. A Service wants to develop the most advanced system to address its perceived need, whereas the Secretary of Defense must balance competing requirements across the Department of Defense. The military and the civilian leadership may also have different strategic perspectives that feed this conflict. Through the detailed analysis of three case studies -- the Nuclear Surface Navy in the 1960s, the B-1 Bomber in the 1970s, and the Crusader Artillery System in the 2000s -- the author explores some of the common themes and sources of friction that arise in civil-military relations concerning major weapons programs. He concludes with some thoughts on how the Secretary of Defense can anticipate and reduce these sources of friction, while retaining an environment that supports healthy debate."--P. [ix]
650		0	_aarms procurement _xcivil-military relations
651		7	_aUSA _xarms procurement
710	2		_aArmy War College (U.S.). _bStrategic Studies Institute
856	4	1	_uhttp://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=1030
942			_cREP
946			_asip1103
999			_c75911 _d75911