000			02071cam a22002777a 4500
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007			cr |||||||||||
008			110505s2011 xxu|||| o |10| ||eng c
020			_a0309208858
020			_a9780309208840
040			_aSipr
041			_aeng
110	2		_aNational Research Council (U.S.). _bCommittee on Risk-Based Approaches for Securing the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex
245	1	0	_aUnderstanding and managing risk in security systems for the DOE nuclear weapons complex (abbreviated version) : _helectronic resource _cCommittee on Risk-Based Approaches for Securing the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex ; Nuclear and Radiation Studies Board ; Division on Earth and Life Studies ; National Research Council of the National Academies
256			_aText
260			_aWashington : _bNational Academies Press, _cc2011.
300			_a1 PDF-file (30 p.)
500			_aE-book.
500			_aA nuclear weapon or a significant quantity of special nuclear material (SNM) would be of great value to a terrorist or other adversary. It is in this context that the U.S. Congress directed the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) -- a semi-autonomous agency in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) responsible for securing nuclear weapons and significant quantities of spent nuclear material (SNM) -- asked the National Academies for advice on augmenting its security approach, particularly on the applicability of quantitative and other risk-based approaches for securing its facilities. In carrying out its charge, the committee has focused on what actions NNSA could take to make its security approach more effective and efficient. The committee concluded that the solution to balancing cost, security, and operations at facilities in the nuclear weapons complex is not to assess security risks more quantitatively or more precisely.
650		7	_anuclear weapons _xfacilities _zUSA
852			_hCD127 G11_533
856	4	0	_uhttp://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=13108#orgss
942			_cMONO
999			_c76023 _d76023