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001			12297764
003			SE-LIBR
005			20120809144731.0
008			110907s2011 paua| | f000 0 eng c
020			_a9781584874942
020			_a1584874945
040			_aAWC _dSipr
041			_aeng
100	1		_aNewland, Samuel J.
245	1	4	_aThe European campaign : _bits origins and conduct / _cSamuel J. Newland, Clayton K. S. Chun.
260			_aCarlisle, PA : _bStrategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, _c2011.
300			_ax, 455 p. : _bill., maps ; _c23 cm.
500			_a"June 2011."
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 389-406).
505	0		_aIntroduction -- Chapter 1. The European campaign : origins -- Chapter 2. Was Europe first? -- Chapter 3. 1943 : Frustrations and successes -- Chapter 4. D-Day : Planning and execution -- Chapter 5. Toward the German border : Operations COBRA, the Falaise Pocket, and Operation ANVIL -- Chapter 6. Operation MARKET GARDEN -- Chapter 7. The Hürtgen Campaign -- Chapter 8. The Ardennes Offensive -- Chapter 9. The Ruhr or Berlin -- Chapter 10. Conclusions and observations -- Appendix I. Developing strategy : a look at the other side -- Appendix II. To Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force.
520			_aGiven the significance of World War II and the interest in the European Campaign, the authors offer a fresh look at the operations involved in winning the war in Europe. The authors begin with an examination of prewar planning for various contingencies, then move to the origins of "Germany first" in American war planning. They then focus on the concept, favored by both George C. Marshall and Dwight D. Eisenhower, that the United States and its Allies had to conduct a cross-channel attack and undertake an offensive aimed at the heartland of Germany. Following this background contained in the initial chapters, the remainder of the book provides a comprehensive discussion outlining how the European Campaign was carried out. The authors conclude that American political leaders and war planners established logical and achievable objectives for the nation's military forces. However during the campaign's execution, American military leaders were slow to put into practice what would later be called operational level warfare. For comparison, the authors include an appendix covering German efforts at war planning in the tumultuous 1920s and 1930s.
650		7	_aWorld War II _xmilitary strategy _xmilitary history _xmilitary operations _xdecisionmaking _zUSA _zGermany
700	1		_aChun, Clayton K. S.
710	2		_aUS Army War College. _bStrategic Studies Institute, SSI
852			_h940.53 Newland
856	4	1	_uhttp://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1075.pdf
942			_cMONO
999			_c76478 _d76478