000			02644cam a22003377a 4500
001			12418727
003			SE-LIBR
005			20120809144735.0
008			111122s2011 pau | f000 0 eng c
020			_a1584875097
020			_a9781584875093
040			_aAWC _dIXA _dSipr
041			_aeng
100	1		_aMumford, Andrew
245	1	0	_aPuncturing the counterinsurgency myth : _bBritain and irregular warfare in the past, present, and future / _cAndrew Mumford
260			_aCarlisle, PA : _bStrategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, _c2011
300			_avii, 26 p. ; _c23 cm.
490	1		_aAdvancing strategic thought series
500			_a"September 2011."
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 23-26).
505	0		_aIntroduction -- Myth #1 : the British military is an effective learning institution -- Myth #2 : British civil-military COIN planning is strategically perceptive -- Myth #3 : the British military has flexibly adapted to the demands of COIN -- Myth #4 : the British military has an ingrained educational approach to COIN -- Myth #5 : Iraq represented the zenith of 60 years worth of modern COIN learning -- Myth #6 : the British can do COIN alone -- Myth #7 : the British "don't talk to terrorists" -- Myth #8 : "hearts and minds" and "minimum force" are sacrosanct elements of the British way of COIN -- Myth #9 : the Malayan emergency is the archetypal COIN campaign -- Myth #10 : the British military are the ultimate COIN practitioners -- The value of the British experience.
520			_aThis monograph holds that an aura of mythology has surrounded conventional academic and military perceptions of British performance in the realm of irregular warfare. It identifies 10 myths regarding British counterinsurgency performance and seeks to puncture them by critically assessing the efficacy of the British way of counterinsurgency from the much-vaunted, yet over-hyped, Malayan Emergency to the withdrawal of combat troops from Iraq in 2009. It challenges perceptions of the British military as an effective learning institution when it comes to irregular warfare and critically assesses traditional British counterinsurgency strategic maxims regarding hearts and minds and minimum force.
650		7	_acounterinsurgency _zUK
651		7	_aUK _xmilitary strategy _xmilitary doctrines _xhistory
653			_airregular warfare
710	2		_aUS Army War College. _bStrategic Studies Institute, SSI
830		0	_aAdvancing strategic thought series. _9277
852			_h323.27 Mumford
856	4	1	_uhttp://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1086.pdf
942			_cREP
999			_c76710 _d76710