000 | 03229cam a22003977a 4500 | ||
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001 | 13884684 | ||
003 | SE-LIBR | ||
005 | 20130207092601.0 | ||
008 | 130205s2012 pau | f000 0 eng c | ||
020 | _a1584875569 | ||
020 | _a9781584875567 | ||
040 |
_aAWC _dAWC _dOSU _dUtOrBLW _dSipr |
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041 | _aeng | ||
100 | 1 | _aManwaring, Max G. | |
245 | 1 | 0 |
_aVenezuela as an exporter of 4th generation warfare instability / _cMax G. Manwaring |
246 | 3 | _aVenezuela as an exporter of fourth generation warfare instability | |
260 |
_aCarlisle, PA : _bStrategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, _c2012 |
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300 |
_axi, 46 p. ; _c23 cm |
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490 | 1 | _aStrategic Studies Institute monograph | |
500 | _aSIP1302 | ||
500 | _a"December 2012." | ||
504 | _aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 38-46) | ||
505 | 0 | _aHugo Chavez's Bolivarian vision and how to achieve it -- Key components of the Chavez strategic-level asymmetric warfare -- The paramilitary operational model -- Implications and recommendations. | |
520 | _aAlmost no one seems to understand the Marxist-Leninist foundations of Hugo Chavez's political thought. It becomes evident, however, in the general vision of his "Bolivarian Revolution." The abbreviated concept is to destroy the old foreign-dominated (U.S. dominated) political and economic systems in the Americas, to take power, and to create a socialist, nationalistic, and "popular" (direct) democracy in Venezuela that would sooner or later extend throughout the Western Hemisphere. Despite the fact that the notion of the use of force (compulsion) is never completely separated from the Leninist concept of destroying any bourgeois opposition, Chavez's revolutionary vision will not be achieved through a conventional military war of maneuver and attrition, or a traditional insurgency. According to Lenin and Chavez, a "new society" will only be created by a gradual, systematic, compulsory application of agitation and propaganda (i.e., agit-prop). That long-term effort is aimed at exporting instability and generating public opinion in favor of a "revolution" and against the bourgeois system. Thus, the contemporary asymmetric revolutionary warfare challenge is rooted in the concept that the North American (U.S.) "Empire" and its bourgeois political friends in Latin America are not doing what is right for the people, and that the socialist Bolivarian philosophy and leadership will. This may not be a traditional national security problem for the United States and other targeted countries, and it may not be perceived to be as lethal as conventional conflict, but that does not diminish the cruel reality of compulsion. | ||
651 | 0 |
_aVenezuela _xpropaganda _xinternal politics _xgovernment |
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651 | 0 |
_aVenezuela _xmilitary strategy _xguerrilla warfare |
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651 | 7 |
_aVenezuela _xforeign policy _xarmed forces |
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653 | _aasymmetric warfare | ||
653 | _aChávez Frías, Hugo | ||
653 | _aparamilitary forces | ||
710 | 2 |
_aUS Army War College. _bStrategic Studies Institute, SSI |
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830 | 0 | _aSSI monograph | |
852 | _h323.27 Manwaring | ||
856 | 4 | 1 | _uhttp://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=1139 |
942 | _cREP | ||
999 |
_c77867 _d77867 |