000 | 03759cam a22003617a 4500 | ||
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001 | 13474900 | ||
003 | SE-LIBR | ||
005 | 20131031093444.0 | ||
008 | 120620s2011 pau f000 0 eng c | ||
020 | _a9781584875130 | ||
020 | _a1584875135 | ||
040 |
_aAWC _dFUG _dIXA _dAFQ _dDEBBG _dDLC _dAlb _dSipr |
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041 | _aeng | ||
100 | 1 | _aKrickus, Richard J | |
245 | 1 | 4 |
_aThe Afghanistan question and the reset in U.S.-Russian relations / _cRichard J. Krickus |
246 | 3 | _aAfghanistan question and the reset in US-Russian relations | |
246 | 3 | _aAfghanistan question and the reset in United States-Russian relations | |
260 |
_aCarlisle, PA : _bStrategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, _c[2011] |
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300 |
_axii, 159 p. ; _c23 cm |
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490 | 1 |
_aLetort paper ; _v[no. 52] |
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500 | _a"October 2011." ; SIP1311 | ||
504 | _aIncludes bibliographical references. | ||
505 | 0 | _aSummary -- Introduction -- The American skeptics -- Russian skeptics -- The American rationale -- The Russian rationale -- The study's objectives -- Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The decision to invade -- Escalation -- Bringing the Red Army home -- What was happening? -- The U.S. reaction -- The end -- The failure to create a stable post-Soviet government and civil war. The United Nations proposal -- Why the proposal failed -- Washington's and Moscow's failure -- The Taliban and Osama bin Laden. The origins of the Taliban -- Osama bin Laden -- The United States acknowledges bin Laden as a threat -- 9/11 and war against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. The September 2001 terrorist attacks -- Routing the jihadists -- The Karzai government -- Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda : an assessment -- A partial victory -- Three scenarios. The existing situation or plan A : an unstable but viable Afghanistan through COIN -- The insurgency -- The Karzai government -- Security forces -- The civilian-economic component -- Declining support for the war within the United States -- Pakistan -- Plan B : partition -- A Taliban victory -- The global jihadists prevail -- The Taliban return to power with a national agenda -- The Russian response -- Countering Afghan narcotics -- The struggle over Manas -- The northern distribution network -- Central Asia and the North Caucasus -- Concluding remarks and recommendations. Identifying the enemy : a civil war within Islam -- Making room for the rest -- The American malaise -- Sticking to the 2014 Afghanistan exit schedule -- Preparing for Bonn II -- Plan B : partition -- Preparing for the worst case scenario (Plan C) : a Taliban victory -- Confronting Pakistan -- The time has come to reduce our profile in the Middle East -- Sustaining and enlarging security cooperation with Russia. | |
520 | _aThe ability of the United States and Russia to cooperate in Afghanistan represents a solid test of their reset in relations. The author provides the historical background to the Afghanistan Question and assesses current events in the Afghan war with three objectives in mind: 1) to determine whether Russian-American cooperation in Afghanistan has been successful; 2) to identify and evaluate the successes and failures of the counterinsurgency strategy as the transition from U.S. to Afghanistan authority gains traction in the 2011-14 time frame; and 3) to provide conclusions and recommendations bearing on developments in Afghanistan. | ||
651 | 0 |
_aAfghanistan _xinternal politics |
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651 | 0 |
_aAfghanistan _xarmed conflicts |
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651 | 0 |
_aUSA _xforeign policy _zRussia |
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710 | 2 |
_aArmy War College. _bStrategic Studies Institute |
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830 | 0 |
_aLetort papers ; _v[no. 52] |
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852 | _h327ser Strategic | ||
856 | 4 | 1 | _uhttp://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1089 |
942 | _cREP | ||
999 |
_c78308 _d78308 |