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005 | 20140812151931.0 | ||
008 | 130313b xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d | ||
040 | _aSipr | ||
041 | _aeng | ||
100 | _aAlbrecht, Eduardo Zachary | ||
245 |
_aNorth Korea & the UN Security Council : _baction, reaction, trust and mistrust / _cEduardo Zachary Albrecht _h[electronic resource] |
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260 |
_aNew York, NY : _bIPI, _c2013 |
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300 | _a16 p. | ||
500 | _aSIP1306 | ||
500 | _a"March 2013". | ||
500 | _aNorth Korea’s underground nuclear test on February 12, 2013, was the latest in a series of provocations that form part of a slow-motion proliferation strategy. As the UN Security Council responded with sanctions in early March, the world body again contributed to a pattern of action, reaction, trust, and mistrust with the recalcitrant state. These are the implications of this report on the relationship between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the UN Security Council. It explores the recent history of the relationship by analyzing four similar episodes—missile firings in July 2006, a nuclear test in October 2006, a second nuclear test in May 2009, and a rocket launch in April 2012—and the Security Council’s reaction in each case. | ||
650 |
_anuclear testing _xUN _xSecurity Council _zNorth Korea |
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710 | _aInternational Peace Institute, IPI | ||
852 | _hCD2013 G13/176 | ||
856 | _uhttp://www.ipinst.org/publication/policy-papers/detail/389-north-korea-a-the-un-security-council-action-reaction-trust-and-mistrust.html | ||
942 | _cEMON | ||
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