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001			18247874
003			SE-LIBR
005			20161010145459.0
008			150814s2015 pauab f000 0 eng d
020			_a1584876832
020			_a9781584876830
040			_aWNC _dDLC _dAlb _dSipr
041			_aeng
100	1		_aMason, M. Chris
245	1	4	_aThe strategic lessons unlearned from Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan : _bwhy the Afghan National Security Forces will not hold, and the implications for the U.S. Army in Afghanistan / _cM. Chris Mason
246	3		_aWhy the Afghan National Security Forces will not hold, and the implications for the United States Army in Afghanistan
260			_aCarlisle, PA : _bSSI and US Army War College Press, _c2015
300			_ax, 222 pages : _billustrations, maps (some color) ; _c23 cm
500			_a"June 2015."
500			_aSIP1610
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 200-210).
505	0		_aPart I. Why the Afghan National Security Forces cannot hold, and the implications for the U.S. Army in Afghanistan. Summary -- Relative geographical and force sizes -- Comparison of the ground forces -- Comparison of the air forces -- Comparison of the paramilitary police forces -- Comparison of the irregular forces -- Strategic impact of irregulars -- Military conclusions regarding comparable force sizes -- Close air support : the sine qua non of Afghan National Security Forces survival -- The unending civil war -- Attrition : the force killer -- The ethnic time bomb -- The elephant in the room -- Countervailing arguments -- Part II. Afghanistan year-by-year 2015-19. Motivation : why the Afghan National Army will collapse in the south -- Where does motivation come from? The critical legitimacy factor -- The fallacy of "nation-building" -- The future of Afghanistan by year from 2015 to 2019 -- Part III. The strategic lessons unlearned from Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Impediments to strategic judgment -- Guidelines for future wars -- Conclusions.
520			_a"The wars in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan were lost before they began, not on the battlefields, where the United States won every tactical engagement, but at the strategic level of war. In each case, the U.S. Government attempted to create a Western-style democracy in countries which were decades at least away from being nations with the sociopolitical capital necessary to sustain democracy and, most importantly, accept it as a legitimate source of governance. The expensive indigenous armies created in the image of the U.S. Army lacked both the motivation to fight for illegitimate governments in Saigon, Baghdad, and Kabul and a cause that they believed was worth dying for, while their enemies in the field clearly did not. This book examines the Afghan National Security Forces in historical and political contexts, explains why they will fail at the tactical, operational and strategic levels of war, why they cannot and will not succeed in holding the southern half of the country, and what will happen in Afghanistan year-by-year from 2015 to 2019. Finally, it examines what the critical lessons unlearned of these conflicts are for U.S. military leaders, why these fundamental political lessons seem to remain unlearned, and how the strategic mistakes of the past can be avoided in the future"--Publisher's web site.
651		7	_aAfghanistan _xinsurgency _xarmed forces _xarmy _xmilitary strategy _zUSA
653			_anationbuilding
653			_aforecasting
653			_acase studies
710	2		_aUS Army War College. _bStrategic Studies Institute, SSI
852			_h(581) Mason
856	4	1	_uhttp://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=1269
942			_cMONO
999			_c79214 _d79214