000			02718cam a22002897a 4500
001			21540435
003			SE-LIBR
005			20170918113634.0
008			170915s2017 enkab 000 0 eng c
020			_a1138563706
020			_a9781138563704
040			_aYDX _dWNC _dSipr
041			_aeng
100	1		_aSutyagin, Igor
245	1	0	_aRussia's new ground forces : _bcapabilities, limitations and implications for international security / _cIgor Sutyagin with Justin Bronk
260			_aAbingdon : _bpubl on behalf of RUSI by Routledge journals, an imprint of T&F, _c2017
300			_ax, 139 pages : _billustrations, maps ; _c24 cm.
490	1		_aWhitehall paper ; _vno. 89.
500			_aSIP1710
520			_aThis Whitehall Paper provides an in-depth analysis of Russia’s Ground Forces, including airborne and naval troops. It examines their role in Russian foreign policy, reforms to units’ equipment and operational roles, performance during combat operations against Ukraine, and current unit deployment locations and purposes in the Central, Southern and Western Military Districts. Russia perceives itself as operating from a position of weakness and surrounded by superior NATO forces. It is pursuing a programme of military reform, both in terms of equipment and structures. The Russian Ground Forces are being geared towards fighting in aggressive, short, sharp and complex operations into enemy territory, as well as being streamlined to increase readiness levels and deployability at short notice. However, operations against Ukraine have required force generation efforts from almost every Russian Ground Forces formation, including those in the Far East, which is evidence that the Kremlin’s ability to sustain even a moderate tempo of operations in the medium term is limited. Furthermore, chronic undermanning and morale issues remain, which will be exacerbated by the political decision to re-establish division-scale formations. In addition, Western sanctions and Russia’s difficult economic situation are severely hampering efforts to extend equipment reforms across the whole force. Russian Ground Forces should not be seen by the West as an unstoppable colossus. However, the West must not ignore the unmistakable Russian efforts to prepare for offensive, high-tempo operations against NATO, and the formidable political will that will use them if given the opportunity.
651		7	_aRussia _xarmed forces _xrestructuring _xforce structure _xmilitary reforms _xmilitary strategy
700	1		_aBronk, Justin
830		0	_aWhitehall paper series ; _v89.
852			_h327ser Royal
856			_uhttp://www.tandfonline.com/toc/rwhi20/89/1?nav=tocList
942			_cREP
999			_c79481 _d79481