000			02104nam a22003377a 4500
999			_c80135 _d80135
001			zd1ht3b9wbslwbmg
003			SE-LIBR
005			20220207160817.0
007			cr ||| |||||
008			220131s2022 sw |||||o|||||000 ||eng|c
040			_aSipr
041			_aeng
100	1		_aSaalman, Lora
245	1	0	_aMultidomain deterrence and strategic stability in China / _h[electronic resource] _cLora Saalman
260			_aSolna : _bSIPRI, _c2022
300			_a11 p.
490	0		_aSIPRI insights on peace and security ; _v2022:2
500			_aSIP2223
500			_aOver the past few years, China has displayed a wide range of advances in military capabilities and infrastructure, including its test of a hypersonic glide vehicle coupled with a fractional orbital bombardment system and evidence of new intercontinental ballistic missile silos. While China and the United States remain at political odds, there are indications that China’s strategies in space, cyberspace and nuclear domains are increasingly converging with those of the USA, as well as Russia. A key question is whether this strategic convergence is a stabilizing or destabilizing phenomenon. To answer the question, this paper explores the current state of Chinese discussions on multidomain deterrence and strategic stability, with a focus on active defence and proactive defence. It then examines how these concepts are manifesting themselves in China’s postural and technological indicators, including pre-mating of nuclear warheads to delivery platforms, expanded nuclear arsenal size, possible shifts towards launch on warning, integration of dual-capable systems, and advances in machine learning and autonomy. It concludes with a discussion of what these trends mean for future strategic stability talks.
650		4	_astrategy
650		4	_aspace technology
650		4	_adefence policy
651		4	_aarms race
651		4	_aChina
653			_adeterrence
653			_aWMD
710	2		_aSIPRI
852			_hFri e-publikation
856	4	1	_uhttps://doi.org/10.55163/FYXQ3853
942			_cEMON