000			01923cam a22002897a 4500
001			bs18cq408sgjntb9
003			SE-LIBR
005			20230316130826.0
007			cr ||| |||||
008			230315s2023 sw |||||o|||||000 ||eng|c
040			_aSipr
041			_aeng
100	1		_aFedchenko, Vitaly
245	1	0	_aNuclear security during armed conflict : _h[electronic resource] _blessons from Ukraine / _cVitaly Fedchenko.
260			_aSolna : _bSIPRI, _c2023
300			_a23 p.
490	0		_aSIPRI research policy paper
500			_a"March 2023"
500			_aSIP2323
500			_aThe attacks on nuclear installations in Ukraine by the Russian military in 2022 were unprecedented. Nuclear security aims at prevention, detection and response to malicious or unauthorized acts by non-state actors, not the armed forces of a state. However, an international armed conflict creates new circumstances in which a national nuclear security regime must operate. In March 2022 the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) highlighted ‘seven indispensable pillars of nuclear safety and security’ in extraordinary circumstances. There are three further areas in which the international nuclear security framework can be strengthened and prepared for extraordinary events, including armed conflict. First, there is a need to further clarify and plan the actions of competent authorities. Second, the IAEA may be able to assist member states in developing guidance for specific scenarios during extraordinary events. Third, there should be further integration of nuclear security with nuclear safety and emergency preparedness and response.
650		4	_aarmed conflicts _xnuclear energy _xIAEA _xsafeguards _xthreat perception _xfacilities
651		4	_aUkraine
710	2		_aSIPRI
852			_hFri e-publikation
856	4	0	_uhttps://doi.org/10.55163/ZZSP5617
942			_cEMON
999			_c80297 _d80297