000			02124cam a22003017a 4500
001			8jn3pfkm6xb7cbhr
003			SE-LIBR
005			20231002131117.0
007			cr ||| |||||
008			181109s2018 sw |||||o|||||000 ||eng|c
040			_aSipr
041			_aeng
100	1		_aRaju, Nivedita
245	1	0	_aThe role of space systems in nuclear deterrence / _h[electronic resource] _cNivedita Raju and Tytti Erästö
256			_aText
260			_aSolna : _bSIPRI, _c2023
300			_a23 p.
490	0		_aSIPRI background paper
500			_aSIP2223
500			_a"September 2023"
500			_aSpace systems are used for multiple civilian and military purposes, including missions related to nuclear deterrence. Consequently, real and perceived military operations targeting space systems may create pathways to nuclear escalation. China, Russia and the United States possess both nuclear weapons and counterspace capabilities, and they are at risk of being drawn into war with each other through regional conflicts and great power competition. These states have integrated space systems into their nuclear deterrence practices to varying degrees for missile early warning, communications, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), and navigation. These space systems can be vulnerable to attack or interference through counterspace capabilities—including direct-ascent and co-orbital anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, directed-energy weapons, electronic interference and cyber operations. Each of the three states’ space systems has varying strategic value. Each system is also vulnerable to the counterspace capabilities of the others. Examining space systems relevant to nuclear deterrence and assessing their vulnerabilities lays the groundwork for further analysis on escalation pathways and risk-reduction measures.
650			_adeterrence _xnuclear strategy _xnuclear weapons _xspace research _xspace _zUSA _zRussia _zChina
700			_aErästö, Tytti
710	2		_aSIPRI
852			_hFri e-publikation
856			_uhttps://doi.org/10.55163/NWLC4997
942			_cEMON
999			_c80355 _d80355