Verifying a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty : technical and organizational considerations / Shannon N. Kile and Robert E. Kelley

A future FMCT should provide for the establishment of a dedicated verification body—a standing verification group (SVG)—that would be formally part of the IAEA and would draw on the agency’s experience and formidable technical skills in implementing safeguards. The SVG would function autonomously from the IAEA Department of Safeguards in terms of interacting with states parties, planning inspections and drawing conclusions about the compliance of parties with their treaty commitments. The conclusions would be shared with an independent FMCT organization (FMCTO) that would be responsible for overseeing the implementation of the treaty and addressing compliance questions.

SIP1209

Cover : "August 2012".

Shannon N. Kile (United States) is a Senior Researcher and Head of the Nuclear Weapons Project of the SIPRI Arms Control and Non-proliferation Programme. His principal areas of research are nuclear arms control and non-proliferation, with a special interest in the nuclear programmes of Iran
and North Korea.

Robert E. Kelley (United States) is a former IAEA senior safeguards
inspector and director of the Iraq Action Team. He is a veteran of over
35 years in the US Department of Energy nuclear weapons complex, most
recently at Los Alamos National Laboratory.

1. Introduction
2. FMCT verification choices
3. FMCT verification tasks and tools
4. The design of an FMCT inspection system
5. The role of the IAEA in verifying an FMCT
6. A proposal for the structure and operation of an FMCT verification body
7. Conclusions
Appendix A. Categories of IAEA safeguards agreement

The renewed momentum behind international efforts to negotiate a fissile
material cut-off treaty (FMCT) has focused attention on how the proposed
ban on the production of fissile material will be verified: what type of
organization should be given this responsibility and what technical
expertise will it require?
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is often identified as the
obvious choice for this role, given its long experience in implementing
nuclear safeguards agreements. Many of the tools and procedures
developed by the IAEA for safeguards purposes could be directly applied to
verifying a future FMCT. However, without changes to its existing
safeguards mandate and practices, the IAEA would be hindered in verifying
treaty compliance in the nuclear weapon-possessing states. This Policy
Paper proposes an alternative arrangement that, while taking advantage of
the IAEA's experience and expertise, creates a verification body tailored
specifically for an FMCT with the requisite legal mandate and technical
capabilities.